
















CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 3468 









An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 









Since governments can influence the demand for a new abatement technology through their 
environmental policy, they may be able to expropriate innovations in new abatement 
technology ex post. This suggests that incentives for environmental R&D may be lower than 
the incentives for market goods R&D. This in turn may be used as an argument for 
environmental R&D getting more public support than other R&D. In this paper we 
systematically compare the incentives for environmental R&D with the incentives for market 
goods R&D. We find that the relationship might be the opposite: When the innovator is able 
to commit to a licence fee before environmental policy is resolved, incentives are always 
higher for environmental R&D than for market goods R&D. When the government sets its 
policy before or simultaneously with the innovator’s choice of licence fee, incentives for 
environmental R&D may be higher or lower than for market goods R&D. 
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The recent literature on environmental R&D suggests that the incentives for
environmental R&D may be lower than the incentives for market goods R&D.
By some authors this is also used as an argument for increasing the share of
environmental R&D in public R&D budgets.1 On the other hand, although
the literature has looked at environmental R&D in a variety of settings, no
contribution has yet systematically compared the incentives for R&D that
reduces abatement costs with the incentives for R&D that reduces the pro-
duction costs of market goods. Moreover, by closer inspection many models
of environmental R&D turn out to be rather special, and hence, our aim is
to conduct the comparison in a more general economic model of innovations.
Finally, we analyze perfect price discrimination by the innovator which to
our knowledge has not been treated before in the context of environmental
innovations.
There are many reasons why the incentives for R&D may be distorted
such that the market outcome is socially ine¢ cient. First, there likely are
both positive and negative externalities in the production of new knowl-
edge; examples of the former are the "standing-on-shoulders" e⁄ect and on
the latter is the "stepping-on-toes" e⁄ect.2 Second, due to imperfect patent
protection, the innovator may not be able to recover the initial R&D invest-
ment.3 These market failures are equally relevant for environmental R&D
and market goods R&D. Unless there is reason to believe there is a systematic
di⁄erence in the magnitude of these market failures between the two cases,
these market failures are not a justi￿cation for policies directed particularly
towards environmental R&D.
Our point of departure is a more fundamental di⁄erence between the mar-
ket goods case and the environmental technology case. In the market good
case demand for an innovation is given from the underlying preferences of
1See for example Montgomery and Smith (2007).
2See for instance Jones and Williams (2000).
3See for example Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), Section 6.2, "Erosion of monopoly
power", page 305.
2consumers or technology of ￿rms, and governments normally do not interfere
with demand. In the environmental technology case, we have the opposite
situation: Through its environmental policy the government cannot help in-
terfering with the demand for the new technology. This makes it possible
for the government partly or fully to expropriate the innovation, and clearly,
this may distort the private incentives for environmental R&D.
Several decades ago, Kydland and Prescott (1977) drew attention to in-
e¢ ciency caused by dynamic inconsistency. This insight has proven essential
for several policy areas - also to environmental economics. For example,
Downing and White (1986) examine the ratchet e⁄ect; if a polluting ￿rm
discovers a less polluting process, the government may tighten the regulation
of the ￿rm. Consequently, the innovating polluting ￿rm may not reap the
(naively) expected bene￿ts from its innovation, and the R&D investment may
turn out not to be pro￿table. Downing and White (1986) conclude that for
all other environmental policy instruments than emission taxes, the ratchet
e⁄ect may lead to too little innovation.
Unlike Downing and White, more recent contributions on environmental
R&D distinguish between the regulated polluting sector, which employs new
abatement technology, and the R&D sector, which develops new abatement
technology. La⁄ont and Tirole (1996) was one of the ￿rst contributions
including a model that separated the innovator from the polluting sector.4
In La⁄ont and Tirole the government expropriates the innovation by setting
a very low price on pollution permits. In order to sell the new technology,
the innovator must accordingly set a very low licence fee which destroys the
incentives for environmental R&D.
La⁄ont and Tirole (1996) analyze the case in which the government is
able to commit to environmental policy before the innovator decides the
price on the innovation. This may, however, not always be the most realistic
case, as politicians seem to adjust environmental policy quite frequently. We
4Articles assuming that R&D is done by one or several R&D ￿rms that di⁄er from the
polluting ￿rms also include Parry (1995), Biglaiser and Horowitz (1995), Denicolo (1999),
Requate (2005), and Montero (2010).
3therefore include in our analysis both the case in which environmental policy
is set simultaneously with the price on the innovation, and the case in which
the innovator is able to commit to a price on the innovation.
Denicolo (1999) and Montero (2010) build on La⁄ont and Tirole with
respect to the sequence of decisions, but their results di⁄er in a number
of ways. For instance, in Montero (2010) the government cannot decide
the price on emission permits, but commits to issuing a certain number of
emission permits. Moreover, the innovation does not necessarily remove all
emissions as in La⁄ont and Tirole, but only a fraction of the emissions. Both
these features of Montero￿ s model changes the game, and allows the innovator
to keep some of the monopoly rents from the innovation.
While in La⁄ont and Tirole (1996) and Montero (2010) all polluting ￿rms
have the same bene￿t from the new technology, Requate (2005) includes het-
erogenous ￿rms. In general this makes it much harder for the government to
expropriate the innovation. Moreover, Requate (2005) also analyzes di⁄erent
sequences of the decisions by the government and the innovator. However, he
does not look at the simultaneous move game. Lastly, Requate (2005) does
not compare the incentives for innovation in the environmental technology
case with the market good case.
In this paper we compare the incentives for R&D that reduces abatement
costs with the incentives for R&D that reduces the production costs of market
goods in a model taken from the general literature on innovations. We assume
throughout the paper that the downstream sector that either produces a
market good or pollutes and abates is competitive. Further, in line with
the observations made by Katz and Shapiro (1986) for general R&D and by
Requate (2005) for environmental R&D, we assume that R&D takes place in
separate R&D ￿rms that sell their innovations in technology markets.5 Each
R&D ￿rm is assumed to be so large that it is not a price taker in the market
5According to Requate (2005), empirical work shows that more than 90 percent of
environmental innovations reducing air and water pollution are invented by non-polluting
￿rms marketing their technology to polluting ￿rms. A similar claim is made by Hanemann
(2009, footnote 76). For market goods R&D, see also Khan and Sokolo⁄ (2004).
4for its innovations.
We show that the presentiment that incentives for environmental R&D
are lower than incentives for market goods R&D is not generally true. When
the innovator is able to commit to a licence fee before environmental policy
(tax or quota) is resolved, incentives are always higher for environmental
R&D than for market goods R&D. Moreover, when the government is able
to commit, but the innovator is not, the relative size of the incentives could
go both ways. The results depend on several factors, including whether the
innovator is able to price discriminate between di⁄erent buyers of the new
technology.
The model is explained in Section 2, and is in Section 3 applied to the
case in which an innovation reduces the costs of producing a regular market.
In Sections 4 through 6 it is assumed that an innovation reduces the abate-
ment cost of polluting ￿rms. In these sections we compare the incentives for
environmental R&D and other R&D. In sections 4 and 5 it is assumed that
the policy instrument is a carbon tax, while we in Section 6 consider the case
of quotas. Finally, in section 7 we consider the case in which the innovator
is able to capture all of the bene￿ts to the downstream sector of the new
technology. Section 8 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 The innovation sector
Our formal model has a similar setup as in La⁄ont and Tirole (1996), Deni-
colo (1999), Requate (2005), and Montero (2010), with only one innovating
￿rm. With more R&D, the new technology is either better (i.e. lower costs)
as in e.g. Montero (2010), or the probability of success (i.e. of obtaining the
new technology) is higher, as in e.g. La⁄ont and Tirole (1996). We consider
the post-innovation situation in which a successful innovation has given some
speci￿c new knowledge that can reduce costs. Old knowledge is supplied by
a competitive sector, and embedded in the cost function of the downstream
5￿rms, while new knowledge is made available by the innovator in exchange
for some payment.
Before turning to the two cases of output being (i) a produced market
good, and (ii) abatement, we shall brie￿ y discuss how the innovator might
be paid for its innovation by the competitive sector. The users of the new
technology must pay a licence fee to the innovator per unit of some variable
that is positively related to aggregate output or abatement. An obvious
case would be the one considered by Katz and Shapiro (1986), where each
downstream ￿rm pays a ￿xed licence fee in order to use the new technology.
However, our model also includes the case in which the licence payment
depends on the use of the new technology by each ￿rm (see e.g. the discussion
in Katz and Shapiro). In any case, total payment to the innovator v is given
by a revenue function that depends on a price parameter ‘ and is increasing
in aggregate output or abatement:
v = v(x;‘)
where x is the aggregate output of a market good or total abatement by
polluting ￿rms in the downstream market.
In our formal model the innovator thus only has a one-piece tari⁄. In
section 7 we argue that expanding this to e.g. a two-part tari⁄ would not
necessarily change any results, as long as the innovator cannot obtain revenue
without creating some distortions in the downstream market for producing
a market good or reducing emissions.
An obvious assumption about the revenue function v = v(x;‘) is that that
a zero price of whatever the licence is linked to gives zero revenue, and also
that revenue is zero if output or abatement is zero; i.e. v(0;‘) = v(x;0) = 0.
It is also reasonable to assume that for a given value of ‘, the use of the new
technology in increasing in output or abatement, so that vx > 0. We also
assume that vl > 0 for small values of ‘, but that v has a maximal level for
any given x, so that vl < 0 for su¢ ciently large values of ‘ (for su¢ ciently
high values of ‘ producers will prefer the old, free technology). Finally, we
6make the additional plausible assumptions that vxx ￿ 0 and vx‘ ￿ 0, ensuring
that private marginal costs of production or abatement are not declining in
x and ‘.
We only give a formal analysis of the post-innovation situation. However,
we assume that the higher the equilibrium revenue is to the innovator in
this post-innovation phase, the larger are the incentives for R&D in the pre-
innovation phase. Hence, the larger is the equilibrium value of v, the better
is the new technology, and/or the higher is the probability of obtaining the
new technology.
2.2 The downstream sector
The downstream sector consists of many small ￿rms producing the same
good. In the case of a market good, x denotes industry supply of the good
produced, and in the case of environmental innovations, x denotes aggregate
abatement. Abatement is de￿ned as the reduction in emissions from the
emission level that would be chosen in the absence of any environmental
regulation.
Once the new technology is developed, the cost function is C(x;0) if the
technology is used in a socially optimal way. However, with a fee on the
use of the technology, the technology will typically be less than optimally
used (La⁄ont and Tirole; Montero), and the cost function is instead C(x;‘),
which hence usually will be higher than C(x;0). We make the standard
assumptions that Cx > 0 and Cxx > 0.
The licence fee ‘ constitutes a pure transfer from the downstream sector
to the innovator, and will in most cases lead to too little adoption of the
new technology. Further, since a higher value of ‘ implies that the new
technology is used to an even lesser extent, we assume C‘ ￿ 0. It also seems
reasonable that Cx‘ ￿ 0, assumed henceforth. It is not obvious what the sign
of C‘‘ should be. However, for values of ‘ beyond some threshold the new
technology will not be used at all, so that C‘ = 0 for such high values of ‘,
suggesting C‘‘ ￿ 0, which is henceforth assumed.
73 R&D incentives for a market good
Once the licence fee ‘ is given, private marginal costs for the market good
are Cx(x;‘) + vx(x;‘). Pro￿t maximizing price takers equate this marginal
cost with the output price, de￿ning the supply function x(p;‘) by
Cx(x;‘) + vx(x;‘) = p (1)
Since Cxx + vxx > 0, x‘ < 0 provided Cx‘ + vx‘ > 0. Moreover, xp > 0 since
Cxx + vxx > 0.
The social and private bene￿t of the market good is denoted B(x), with




The market equilibrium is characterized by demand equal to supply, i.e.
by p = B0(x(p;‘)) where x(p;‘) is de￿ned by (1). This gives an equilibrium
price, and hence also an equilibrium output, for any given ‘. We denote this
equilibrium by p0(‘) and x0(‘). Since Cxx + vxx ￿ B00 > 0, x0(‘) will be a
strictly declining function provided Cx‘ + vx‘ > 0. The curve p0(‘) given by
p = B0(x0(‘)) is hence upward sloping in the (p;‘) diagram in Figure 1 for
B00 < 0.
The innovator will set ‘ taking (1) and (2) into consideration, i.e. so that









The values along the iso-payo⁄ curves for the innovator v0, v0 and vI in
the diagram are higher the further to the right we are in Figure 1, since
dv
dp = vxxp > 0.6 The innovator￿ s optimal choice of ‘ is at the point M in
Figure 1. This is the point along the curve p0(‘) that gives the innovator the
6The iso-payo⁄ curves are curves for constant v(x(p;‘);‘)). Se the Appendix for a
derivation of their properties.
8highest payo⁄.
Denote the solution to (3) by ‘0. The use of the new technology in the case
of a market good will be x0(‘0). From a social welfare point of view ‘ should
be set equal to zero, and we should have Cx(x;0) = p = B0(x). This will yield
x0(0) which is larger than x0(‘0) since x0 is a strictly declining function. The
di⁄erence re￿ ects the e¢ ciency loss from the innovator limiting the access to
the new technology.
4 R&D incentives for abatement when the
policy instrument is a carbon tax
The fundamental di⁄erence from the case of a market good is that now the
regulator interferes with the demand for the new technology through its en-
vironmental policy. It is not obvious at what point in time the environmental
policy is set. In the literature we have identi￿ed the following alternatives:
￿ Environmental policy is set before R&D is carried out.
￿ Environmental policy is set after R&D is carried out, but before the
innovator sets ‘.
￿ Environmental policy is set after R&D is carried out, but simultane-
ously with ‘; i.e. neither the innovator nor the regulator is able to
commit to ‘ or policy.
￿ Environmental policy is set after R&D is carried out, and after the
innovator sets ‘; i.e. the innovator is able to commit to ‘.
In all cases we assume that the choices of the type of abatement tech-
nology and the amount of abatement carried by the polluting ￿rms happens
after environmental policy and ‘ is set.7 Moreover, like most of the cited
7Requate (2005) also includes a case in which the regulator sets environmental policy
after the polluting ￿rms has chosen technology, but before they have decided on the level
of abatement.
9literature we do not consider the ￿rst case. R&D often takes a decade to
complete, and it is di¢ cult to imagine that governments are able to commit
to an environmental policy more than 5-10 years into the future.
It is not easy to argue strongly for any of the three other alternatives. We
know that governments often change emission taxes from year to year, and
at the same time we cannot see what is keeping the innovator from changing
the licence fee accordingly. This suggests to model the determination of the
environmental policy and the licence fee as a simultaneous move game.
La⁄ont and Tirole (1996) propose that the governments can commit to
policy by issuing buy options on emission permits. La⁄ont and Tirole (1996)
therefore argue that governments can commit to policy, and that environ-
mental policy is set before the innovator sets ‘. On the other hand, in many
countries, the government uses carbon taxes alongside emission permits, and
do not commit to the size of the taxes (nor does most governments issue buy
options).
How can the innovator commit to a certain licence fee? The innovator can
try by issuing a Most-Favored-Customer clause, that is, guaranteeing that
its current customers will be reimbursed if the licence fee is lowered in the
future. As shown by Tirole (1988) this may work as a commitment device.
Moreover, since the innovator knows when she is ready to launch her idea
well in advance of the regulator, she could possibly preempt the regulator in
this way.
In this paper we look at all three alternatives, and since R&D costs are
sunk for all alternatives, social welfare is given by:
W = B(x) ￿ C(x;‘) (4)
where B(x) now stands for bene￿ts of abatement8. When setting environ-
mental policy the government maximizes W with respect x, which again
depends on the environmental policy instrument. In this section we focus on
8If E denotes emissions without any abatement and environmental costs are D(E ￿x),
we have B(x) ￿ D(E) ￿ D(E ￿ x), implying B(0) = 0, B0 = D0 and B00 = ￿D00.
10emission taxes; section 5 considers the case of quotas.
The polluting sector has abatement costs equal to C(x;‘)+v(x;‘). Thus,
once both p and ‘ are given, x is determined by setting marginal abatement
costs equal to the emission tax rate. The supply function (1) de￿ning x(p;‘)
is thus valid also when x denotes abatement.
4.1 The tax is set after ‘
If the emission tax p is set after the licence fee ‘ and the regulator sets
this tax equal to the Pigovian level B0, we get exactly the same outcome
as described in the previous section for a market good. The incentives for
environmental R&D would thus be exactly the same as for a market good.
However, this rule for setting the emission tax rate is generally not optimal:
The government should choose p to maximize B(x) ￿ C(x;‘), taking ‘ as
given. This is achieved by equating the social marginal abatement cost with
marginal bene￿ts of abatement, i.e.
Cx(x;‘) = B
0(x) (5)
which in combination with the supply function (1) gives
p = B
0(x) + vx(x;‘) (6)
de￿ning p￿(‘) and x￿(‘) ￿ x(p￿(‘);‘) for any given ‘. It follows that p￿(‘) >
p0(‘), since p0(‘) was de￿ned by p = B0(x) and vx(x;‘) > 0 (unless ‘ = 0).
Since p￿(‘) > p0(‘) and xp > 0, it follows that x￿(‘) > x0(‘).
The reason for the government to set the emission tax rate higher than the
Pigovian rate is to encourage more abatement than what the Pigovian rate
gives: The pricing of the technology makes private marginal abatement costs
higher than social marginal abatement costs, thus giving too little abatement
if the tax rate is at the Pigovian level.
The curve p￿(‘), drawn in Figure 2, is the regulator￿ s response function
for the case of environmental R&D: It tells us what the optimal carbon tax
11is for any given licence fee. Whatever ‘ is, the equilibrium abatement follows
from x(p￿(‘);‘) ￿ x￿(‘). Notice that p￿(‘) must be drawn to the right of
p0(‘) since p￿(‘) > p0(‘).
The innovator will set ‘ taking the regulator￿ s response function into






where vI denotes the equilibrium payo⁄to the innovator when the innovator
sets its price before the government responds.
Denote the optimal ‘ in the abatement technology case ‘￿. If vI > v0,
incentives are higher for environmental R&D than for market goods R&D.
Comparing (3) and (7) and using x￿(‘) > x0(‘) immediately results in the
following proposition:
Proposition 1 If environmental policy is set after the innovator sets the
licence fee, incentives are higher for environmental R&D than for market
goods R&D.
The innovator￿ s optimal choice of ‘ for this case is at the point I in Figure
2. This is the point along the curve p￿(‘) that gives the innovator the highest
payo⁄. Since p￿(‘) > p0(‘) it follows that vI > v0.
4.2 The tax is set simultaneously with ‘
When the innovator takes the carbon tax p as given, its response function
follows from maximizing v(x(p;‘);‘) with respect to ‘. This gives the payo⁄
~ v(p) = max
‘
[v(x(‘;p);‘)] (8)
and the solution ‘￿(p) to this maximization problem is the innovator￿ s re-
sponse function, illustrated in Figure 2. Any point on the curve ‘￿(p) is
given by the tangency point of an iso-payo⁄ curve and the vertical line rep-
resenting the given value of p. We have drawn the curve upward sloping: It
12seems reasonable to expect ‘0(p) > 0, i.e. that a higher demand gives the
monopolist a higher optimal price. However, most of our results remain valid
also if ‘0(p) ￿ 0.
If the innovator chooses ‘ simultaneously with the regulator choosing
p, the equilibrium must be characterized by both players being on their
respective response functions. This equilibrium is illustrated as S in Figure
2. It is clear that the equilibrium tax is higher than the Pigovian level also
in the present case. However, it is not obvious that vS > v0, although this is
the case the way we have drawn Figure 2.
For the special case of B00 = 0 (corresponding e.g. to a ￿xed international
price in the case of a regular good), the curve p0(‘) is vertical, and the point
M will be at the intersection between p0(‘) and ‘(p). In this case we must
therefore have vS > v0. Due to continuity we hence have the following result.
Proposition 2 If environmental policy is set simultaneously with the inno-
vator setting the licence fee, incentives are higher for environmental R&D
than for R&D for market goods if B00 is su¢ ciently small .
In section 5 we give an example for which we may have both vS > v0 and
vS < v0.
4.3 The tax is set prior to ‘
If the tax is set prior to the licence fee, the payo⁄to the innovator is as before
given by (8). However, the tax will generally be di⁄erent for this case than
for the case when p and ‘ are set simultaneously. The regulator will set its
tax taking the innovator￿ s response function ‘￿(p) into consideration.
In Figure 3 we have also included the iso-welfare curves W 0 and W R for
the regulator.9 Since Cl(x;‘) > 0, welfare is declining in ‘ for a given p.
This means that the values along the iso-welfare curves for the regulator are
higher the further down we are in Figure 3.
9See the Appendix for the derivation of the iso-welfare curves.
13The regulator￿ s optimal choice of ‘ for this case is at the point R in
Figure 3. This is the point along the curve ‘￿(p) that gives the regulator the
highest welfare. Using vR to denote the payo⁄ to the innovator in this case,
it is clear that we must have vR < vS provided ‘0(p) > 0 (and vR ￿ vS
if ‘0(p) ￿ 0, henceforth this case is ignored). We have drawn the ￿gure so
vR < v0 < vS < vI. However, it is also possible for v0 to be higher than both
vR and vS or lower than both vR and vS.
From Proposition 2 we know that for the special case of B00 = 0, vS > v0.
For this case it is clear from Figure 3 and the previous discussion that the
sign of ~ v(p)￿v0 must be equal to the sign of p￿B0. In other words, whether
incentives for R&D are larger or smaller for abatement than for market goods
in this case thus depends on whether the optimal emission tax is higher than
or lower than the Pigovian level. To see what the size of p￿B0 in the present
case, we must consider the optimization problem of the government.
Once p is determined, the equilibrium values of ‘ and x follow, denote




0(x) ￿ Cx(x;‘)] ~ x
0(p) ￿ Cl(x;‘)~ ‘
0(p)








The term vx has the same interpretation as before: The government has
an incentive to set the tax above the Pigovian level in order to decrease
the dead weight loss from the monopoly pricing of the new technology. If
~ ‘0(p)
~ x0(p) > 0 and C‘ > 0, the term ￿
~ ‘0(p)
~ x0(p)C‘(x;‘) is negative, tending to make it
optimal to set the emission tax below the Pigovian level. In other words, by
raising the tax above the Pigovian level, the government also increases the
e¢ ciency loss from the suboptimal allocation of abatement between the old
and new technology.
14Proposition 3 If environmental policy is set before the innovator sets the
licence fee, the sign of vR ￿ v0 is ambiguous. For the case of B00 = 0, the
sign of vR ￿ v0 is equal to the sign of p ￿ B0.
In the next section we provide an example in which both vR > v0 and
vR < v0 is possible depending on the parameter values.
5 Example
5.1 The cost and revenue function
In line with Requate (2005) we consider an example in which the bene￿ts
from the new technology vary across ￿rms. For the case of a market good
there is a continuum of ￿rms with unit production capacity. The ￿rms are
ranked so that costs of production are increasing in the number of the ￿rm
x. Similarly, for the the case of abatement there is a continuum of ￿rms with
unit emissions, and ￿rms are ranked so that costs of abatement are increasing
in the number of the ￿rm x.
If a ￿rm chooses the old technology, it has production or abatement cost
gx, while, if a ￿rm buys the new technology, it has production or abatement
cost ‘ + ￿gx, where ‘ is a ￿xed licence fee and ￿ 2 (0;1). Due to the
￿xed costs of the new technology, ￿rms with higher numbers will choose the
new technology (if they produce/abate). In particular, ￿rms up to ^ x will
choose the old technology, where ^ x is determined by g^ x = ￿g^ x+‘, implying
^ x = ‘
(1￿￿)g.
The payo⁄ to innovator is thus given by:























As postulated above c(x;‘) is increasing in both arguments. Note also
that private marginal production or abatement cost cx+vx is equal to ￿gx+‘.
In the following we normalize such that b = g = 1.
5.2 Comparing the cases
The private sector equates private marginal cost with the market price (or
the emission tax): p = ￿x+‘. Let marginal bene￿t of x be given by B0(x) =
1 ￿ ￿x(p). It is then possible to solve the model explicitly for each of the
cases. In the Appendix we solve for the market goods case, and the two cases
in which the government either sets p before or simultaneously with ‘. Here
we just report the results:





2 + 4￿ + 4￿￿
(12)
Turning to the case of abatement, we ￿rst look at the case in which the




￿(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ + 1)
2
(￿ + ￿ + 2￿￿ + 3￿2 + ￿2￿)
2 (13)
The question is whether this revenue is lower than in the market good















16Clearly, for large ￿ and small ￿, this could be the case i.e. both terms in
brackets above are negative. On the other hand, for ￿ equal to zero or close
to zero, innovator revenue is higher in the environmental innovation case.
Finally, the innovator￿ s revenue for the case in which the tax and the
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and again we notice that for large ￿ and small ￿, this could be the case i.e.
both terms in brackets above are negative. On the other hand, for ￿ equal
to zero or close to zero, innovator revenue is higher in the environmental
innovation case.
Assume for instance that ￿ = 0:5. Then v0 < vR < vS if ￿ = 1, vR <
v0 < vS if ￿ = 3, while vR < vS < v0 if ￿ = 4.
6 R&D incentives for abatement with trade-
able emission permits
So far the strategic variable of the regulator has been the price on emissions.
Montero (2010) considers the case in which the amount of issued emission
permits is the strategic variable, and in which the government is able to
commit to a given amount of quotas before the innovator sets the licence fee.
Since the model in Montero is less general than the one in this paper, we
believe it is worthwhile to discuss the issue of quotas versus taxes in light of
our model.
176.1 Quotas are set after the licence fee
Once the licence is set, the socially optimal amount of abatement is given
by (5), de￿ning x￿(‘). The equilibrium payo⁄ to the innovator is therefore
the same as in the tax case given by (7). When the licence is set before the
environmental policy instrument, it therefore makes no di⁄erence whether
an emission tax or quotas are used as the policy instrument. Proposition 1
remains valid also for the quota case.
6.2 Quotas and the licence fee are set simultaneously
It is useful to start by deriving the response functions of the innovator and
the government. For any value of x the innovator will chose ‘ to maximize
v(x;‘), giving ‘￿(x). This function is increasing in x provided vx‘ > 0. It is
drawn as the line ‘￿(x) in Figure 4. The values along the iso-payo⁄ curves
for the innovator v0 and vS in the diagram are higher the further to the right
we are in Figure 4, since vx(x;‘) > 0.
The government wants to maximize B(x) ￿ C(x;‘), giving the response
function x￿(‘) de￿ned by B0(x) ￿ Cx(x;‘) = 0. As shown in Figure 4 it
is downward sloping provided Cx‘ > 0. Notice that for the special case of
Cx‘ = 0 for all (x;‘), which is true in the example in section 5, x￿(‘) will be
a vertical line. When x and ‘ are set simultaneously, we get the outcome S
in Figure 4.
In Figure 4 we have also drawn the curve x0(‘) which is given above
from (1) and (2). This curve is drawn to the left of the curve x￿(‘) of the
same reason as p0(‘) is to the left of p￿(‘) in the ￿gures above. That is, the
government wants more use of the new technology than the market solution
due to the e¢ ciency loss from the licence fee.
What can we say about vS( v at S) compared with v0 (i.e. v at M)? In
the ￿gure vS > v0. This will certainly be true if Cx‘ = 0 for all (x;‘), which
is true in the example in section 5, implying that x(‘) is a vertical line.10
10We have also solved the example in section 5 for the case of emission quotas. It can
be obtained for the authors upon request.
18However, vS < v0 is also possible.11
6.3 Quotas are set before the licence fee
In Figure 4 we have also included the iso-welfare curve W Q for the regulator.
Since Cl(x;‘) > 0, welfare is declining in ‘ for a given x. This means that the
values along the iso-welfare curves for the regulator are higher the further
down we are in Figure 4.
The government now gets to choose a point on ‘￿(x), and it will choose
the point Q in Figure 4. It must always be true that vQ ￿ vS, with < if ‘￿(x)
is upward sloping, i.e. if vx‘ > 0. Since vS < v0 is possible (see footnote 11),
vQ < v0 is therefore also possible. In the ￿gure vQ > v0. One possibility of
this occurring is the case in which Cx‘ = vx‘ = 0 but vx > 0. In this case
‘￿(x) is horizontal while x(‘) will be vertical and to the right of x0(‘). In this
case Q and S will coincide, and vQ = vS > v0. 12
7 The innovator can capture all of the bene-
￿ts from its innovation
So far, we have assumed that the innovator only has a one-piece tari⁄. Ex-
panding this to e.g. a two-part tari⁄would not necessarily change any results,
as long as the innovator cannot obtain revenue without creating distortions
in the downstream market for producing a market good or reducing emis-
sions. There are two distortions that are driving the results obtained so far.
First, the pricing of the technology implies that it is used less widely than
what is optimal (for any output or abatement level), so that social costs are
higher than with an optimal use of the technology. In our model this implies
that C(x;‘) > C(x;0). Without this distortion, the government would not
11We have constructed an example, available upon request, for which both vS < v0 and
vS > v0 are possible.
12In the example in section 5 with emission quotas we show that both vQ > v0 and
vQ < v0 are possible. It can be obtained from the authors upon request.
19have any interest in the size of ‘ per se, and if it were to set its environmen-
tal policy before ‘ it would simply choose p (for the tax case) or x (for the
quota case) on its response function as explained after (6). (Notice that (9)
is identical to (6) for C‘ = 0). Thus, R would coincide with S in Figure 3,
and Q would coincide with S in Figure 4.
The second distortion is that the pricing of the technology makes private
marginal production or abatement costs higher than the social marginal costs.
This distorts the choice of the output or abatement level. Without this
distortion, the curve p￿(‘) in Figures 2 and 3 would coincide with the curve
p0(‘).
Even if the pricing of the new technology is more complex than the one-
dimensional price assumed in this paper, it is di¢ cult to image that these
two distortions can be completely eliminated. Nevertheless, it is useful to
consider the extreme case in which the innovator has so much information
and ability to discriminate between di⁄erent users of its technology that it
can obtain all of the downstream sector￿ s gross bene￿ts of using the new
technology. The rest of this section is therefore devoted to a relatively brief
discussion of this case.
Clearly, it is in the innovator￿ s interest that the cost of the downstream
sector is as low as possible, thus making the revenue that the innovator can
obtain as large as possible. The ￿rst distortion mentioned above is thus
eliminated, implying that the cost of the downstream sector will be C(x;0).
However, as we shall see below it is not obvious that the innovator will wish to
eliminate the second distortion mentioned above: By pricing its technology
in a manner that makes private marginal costs exceed social marginal costs,
the innovator can in some cases increase the output price/emission tax so
that gross bene￿ts of the downstream sector are increased.
7.1 Regulation with an emission tax
Before any payment to the innovator, the pro￿t to the downstream sector of
adopting the new technology in a socially optimal way is
20V = [px ￿ C(x;0)] ￿ ￿(p) (14)
where ￿(p) is the pro￿t if only the old technology is used. Assume that the
innovator due to sophisticated pricing of its technology is able to appropriate
all of this pro￿t. Moreover, assume that the innovator through its pricing
also is able to determine x (an example of how this may be done is given
below).
Consider ￿rst the simplest case in which p is given when the innovator
sets its price parameters. This will be the case when x is abatement and an
environmental tax is set simultaneously with or prior to the the innovators
price schedule. Clearly, the best the innovator can do is to choose x to
maximize V , giving
Cx(x;0) = p (15)
Social welfare is maximized for B0 (x) = Cx(x;0); given (15) this is ob-
tained by the government setting p so that the equilibrium outcome satis￿es
B




￿ F for ￿rst-best ￿ denote the outcome given by (15) and (16).
Consider next the case of a market good. In this case the equilibrium will
satisfy B0 (x) = p no matter what the innovator does. Hence, it is possible for
the innovator to choose
￿
pF;xF￿
, giving it the same value of V as in the case
above. However, usually the innovator can do better. Inserting B0 (x) = p
into V and di⁄erentiating w.r.t. x gives, using ￿0(p) = xold(p) = xold(B0(x))
(in obvious notation) from the envelope theorem:
V
0(x) = [B








Assume that V (x) is concave and that xF = x(pF) > xold(pF); the latter
inequality holding provided social marginal costs with the new technology are
21lower than marginal costs with the old technology. It then follows from (17)
that V 0(xF) < 0, so that the value of x maximizing V (x) is lower than xF.
De￿ning xM ￿ M for market ￿ by V 0(xM) = 0, we hence have xM < xF and





implies (from (17) and V 0(xM) = 0) that xM > xold(pM).
Finally, consider the abatement case in which the regulator chooses its
policy after the innovator has set its price parameters. As in the analysis in
section 4.1, the optimal x is given by B0 (x) = Cx(x;0), i.e. x = xF. Knowing
that p will be determined so this is satis￿ed, the innovator can choose its price
scheme so that it can obtain the value of p that maximizes V . Since x is






We know from above that xF > xM > xold(pM). Since xold(p) is increasing
in p it follows from (18) that pI > pM . If the innovator instead had chosen








￿ ￿(pM)13. The r.h.s.
is the revenue to the innovator for the case of a market good. Since the
innovator chooses pI instead of pM, this gives it an even higher revenue. We
can thus conclude that when the tax is set after the pricing of the innovation,
this gives the innovator a higher revenue and hence higher R&D incentives
than in the corresponding case of a market good.
The results for the case of an emission tax are summarized in the following
proposition:
Proposition 4 If the emission tax is set after the innovator chooses its price
parameters, the innovator￿ s revenue is higher for the case of environmental
R&D than for other R&D. If the emission tax is simultaneously with or before
13Proof of the inequality: By de￿nition pF = Cx(xF;0). Moreover, pM > pF. It follows
that pM > Cx(xF;0) > Cx(x;0) for all x < xF, implying the inequality.
22the innovator￿ s choice of its price parameters, the innovator￿ s revenue is
lower for the case of environmental R&D than for other R&D.
7.2 Regulation with quotas
When the regulator uses quotas as the regulatory instrument, it simply
chooses xF given by (16) as long as abatement costs are given by C(x;0).
The quota price p is determined passively in the market by (15), giving pF.
This holds no matter what the decision sequence is. The revenue to the inno-













= Cold(xF) ￿ C(xF;0),
which from the analysis above is lower than the revenue in the corresponding
case of a market good. Hence, we have
Proposition 5 If quotas are used as the policy instrument, the innovator￿ s
revenue is lower for the case of environmental R&D than for other R&D.
7.3 Example
To understand the results for the tax case it may be useful to consider a
very simple example. Let the downstream sector consist of a ￿xed number of
￿rms, each of which is assumed to bene￿t from the new technology, so that
all output/abatement in equilibrium is with the use of the new technology.
However, as in Requate (2005), ￿rms are assumed to di⁄er in the size of these
bene￿ts.
The innovator￿ s pricing scheme is a price ‘ per unit of x, and in addition a
￿xed fee fi for ￿rm i. This ￿xed fee is set so that ￿rm i is indi⁄erent between
using the new and the old technology, and is then assumed to use the new
technology. The innovator￿ s revenue is hence
V = ￿ifi + ‘x
The innovator captures all of the downstream sector￿ s bene￿ts of the new
23technology by setting each fi as explained above, implying that
￿ifi = max
x [px ￿ C(x;0) ￿ ‘x] ￿ ￿(p)
where px ￿ C(x;0) ￿ ‘x is the aggregate pro￿t of the downstream sector
if it chooses the new technology and ￿(p) as above is the aggregate pro￿t
of the downstream sector if it chooses the old technology. The downstream
sector￿ s choice of x must satisfy Cx(x;0) + ‘ = p, giving x = s(p ￿ ‘) where
s0 = C￿1
xx > 0.
From these equations it follows that
V (p;‘) = max
x [px ￿ C(x;0) ￿ ‘x] ￿ ￿(p) + ‘s(p + ‘)
and using the envelope theorem we ￿nd





For any given value of p, the best the innovator can do is to set ‘ = 0.
Whatever ‘ is, the downstream sector￿ s output or abatement choice im-
plies that
Cx(s(p ￿ ‘);0) + ‘ = p (19)
Moreover, whatever ‘ is, (19) implies that the government achieves B0(x) =
Cx(x;0) by setting p so that
B
0 (s(p ￿ ‘)) + ‘ = p (20)
When p is determined prior to or simultaneously with ‘ and f, we know
that ‘ = 0, so (19) and (20) give pF as de￿ned above. On the other hand,
when p is determined after ‘ and f, the innovator knows from (19) and (20)
that p ￿ ‘ is independent of ‘, so that the maximal value of V is given by
Vp ￿ V‘ = 0, implying s(p ￿ ‘) = xold(p).
24For the case of a market good, we have
B
0 (s(p ￿ ‘)) = p (21)
instead of (20). Together with (19) this gives p as an increasing function of ‘
(but now with
dp
d‘ < 1), so that also in this case it is optimal for the innovator
to set ‘ > 0. The interpretation is that the innovator uses its market power to
restrict output in the downstream sector, thus increasing gross pro￿ts there.
Had the downstream sector been a monopolist, it would itself restrict output
in this manner, and there would be no need for the innovator to set ‘ > 0.
8 Discussion and conclusion
As mentioned in the introduction there are many reasons why the incentives
for R&D may be distorted such that the market outcome is socially ine¢ cient.
However, to our knowledge, empirical research has so far not been able to
show that there is a systematic di⁄erence in the magnitude of these market
failures between environmental R&D and market goods R&D.
In this paper we have investigated to what extent the time inconsistency
problem distort the private incentives for environmental R&D, and could
serve as an argument for increasing the share of environmental R&D in public
R&D budgets. We ￿nd that the presentiment that incentives for environmen-
tal R&D are lower than incentives for market goods R&D is not generally
true. When the innovator is able to commit to a licence fee before envi-
ronmental policy is resolved, incentives are always higher for environmental
R&D than for market goods R&D. This result holds independent of the type
of environmental policy instrument being used.
Further, when the government is able to commit, but the innovator is
not, or when neither the innovator nor the government is able to commit,
the relative size of the incentives could go both ways. This result also holds
independent of the type of environmental policy instrument being used. Only
in the case when the innovator is able to capture all private surplus from the
25innovation and the innovator cannot commit to a licence fee before environ-
mental policy is resolved, incentives are unambiguously higher for market
goods R&D than for environmental R&D. With perfect price discrimination,
the innovator uses its pricing strategy to induce the downstream sector to
behave in a monopolistic way thereby increasing this sector￿ s gross surplus.
In the environmental R&D case this is not possible if environmental policy
is determined simultaneously with or before the innovator￿ s price scheme.
Since the perfect price discrimination case seems unrealistic, we conclude
that neither the market failure argument nor the time inconsistency argument
provide a convincing justi￿cation for policies directed particularly towards
environmental R&D.
There are also other reasons why it may prove undesirable for the regula-
tor to expropriate an abatement technology innovation. In our model there
is only one polluting sector. However, for some environmental problems, like
for instance climate change, many di⁄erent sectors emit the same type of
pollutant. If the innovation is only relevant for one of the sectors and envi-
ronmental regulation is harmonized across sectors, the regulator may not be
able to expropriate the innovation.
Throughout the paper we have assumed that R&D takes place in a sepa-
rate R&D ￿rm that sells its innovations to a competitive downstream sector
producing either a market good or pollution abatement. If R&D instead
took place in the competitive downstream sector and new knowledge became
available to all ￿rms in the sector free of charge, there is no di⁄erence between
the incentives for market goods R&D and the incentives for environmental
R&D. It is the innovator￿ s ability to control the access to new knowledge, and
the regulators￿ s desire to use environmental policy to counteract the negative
e⁄ect of this control, which creates the di⁄erences in the incentives between
environmental R&D and market goods R&D.
269 Appendix
9.1 The iso-payo⁄ curves of the innovator
These curves are implicitly de￿ned by:
v
0 = v(x(p;‘);‘)
where v0 is some ￿xed level of the pay-o⁄. By di⁄erentiating we obtain:






The numerator is negative or zero since vx;xp ￿ 0. The denominator




dp < 0 for ‘ < ‘￿
d‘
dp > 0 for ‘ > ‘￿
Note also that since a higher p, likely yields a higher ‘￿, the turning points
of the iso-payo⁄ curves in Figure 1 are drawn for higher ‘￿, the higher the p.
Moreover, since for a given ‘, payo⁄ is increasing p, pay-o⁄s are increasing
as we move to the right in the diagram (@v
@p = vxxp ￿ 0).
9.2 The iso-welfare curves of the government
These curves are implicitly de￿ned by:
W
0 = B(x(p;‘)) ￿ C(x(p;‘);‘)
where W 0 is some ￿xed level of the welfare. By di⁄erentiating we obtain:






(B0 ￿ Cx)x‘ ￿ C‘
Remember xp;C‘ ￿ 0, while x‘ ￿ 0. The term B0 ￿ Cx is maximized for
some p given by p￿(‘). Thus, both the numerator and the denominator are
negative when p < p￿(‘). When p > p￿(‘), the numerator turns positive. The
sign of the denominator is equal to the sign of @W
@‘ . We assume @W
@‘ < 0, i.e.
a lower price on the new technology, implies more use of the new technology
which saves costs. Hence, for the sign of d‘
dp we have:
d‘
dp > 0 for p < p￿(‘)
d‘
dp < 0 for p > p￿(‘) and @w
@‘ < 0
This is what we have drawn in Figure 3. Since we assume @W
@‘ < 0, welfare
must be increasing as ‘ decreases. In other words, welfare must be decreasing
as we move downwards in the diagram. Lastly, for ‘ above some threshold, no
￿rm adapts the new technology and accordingly C‘;x‘ = 0. The iso-welfare
curves are then not de￿ned.
9.3 Solving the example in section 5
9.3.1 The market goods case
The private sector equates private marginal cost with the market price: p =





Let marginal bene￿t of x be given by B0(x) = 1 ￿ ￿x(p). In the market
goods case we must have p = 1 ￿ ￿x. By inserting for p in (22), and solving





By inserting (23) into (10) we get the revenue function of the innovator as






, and by maximizing this expression wrt.











2 + 4g2￿ + 4g￿￿
(24)
9.3.2 Emission tax is set before licence
The private sector equates private MAC with the emission tax p which gives
x =
p￿‘
￿ as in (22) above. The number of ￿rms choosing the new technology
is x ￿ ^ x =
p￿‘
￿ ￿ ‘
1￿￿. Hence, the revenue function of the innovator as a
function of the emission tax (instead of x) is given by:
v(‘;p) =
p(1 ￿ ￿)‘ ￿ ‘2
￿(1 ￿ ￿)
(25)
The response function of the innovator follows from maximizing this for






and note that the optimal ‘￿ is increasing in the emission tax. For the
reduced form abatement function and the revenue function we further have:
x =
(1+￿)p
2￿ , and v￿ =
(1￿￿)p2
4￿ . Moreover, by inserting for x and ‘￿ into the








Now consider the problem of the government. The government maximizes
the net bene￿t of abatement i.e. B(x(p))￿c(p) with respect to p. As above




￿ + 3￿2 + ￿(1 + ￿)2
and the revenue of the innovator can be calculated:
v
R =
￿(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ + 1)
2
(￿ + ￿ + 2￿￿ + 3g￿2 + ￿2￿)
2 (27)
The question is whether this revenue is lower than in the market good
case. By comparing (13) with (12) from above we have that innovator revenue















Clearly, for large ￿ and small ￿, this could be the case i.e. both terms in
brackets above are negative. On the other hand, for ￿ equal to zero or close
to zero, innovator revenue is higher in the environmental innovation case.
9.3.3 The tax and the licence is set simultaneously
The reaction function of the innovator is given by (26). The government
maximizes the net bene￿t of abatement i.e. B(x(‘;p)) ￿ c(‘;p) with respect
to p. Thus, in order to derive the reaction function of the government, we
need the cost function to be written as a function of ‘ and p. Using x =
p￿‘
￿ ,
we obtain c(‘;p) = ‘2
2(1￿￿) +
(p￿‘)2
2￿ . Hence., the reaction function of the
government is given by:













￿ + ￿ + ￿￿ + ￿2





2 (￿ + ￿)
2 (29)
Comparing vS with v0, we get that innovator revenue is higher in the









and again we notice that for large ￿ and small ￿, this could be the case i.e.
both terms in brackets above are negative. On the other hand, for ￿ equal
to zero or close to zero, innovator revenue is higher in the environmental
innovation case.
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